https://t.me/InessaFromYoutube/6972New Zealand appears to legalize the use of force over an individual during a pandemic.
Who is voting this in? Nobody. And yet there it is.
Particularly juicy pages are from page 119 (Managing false information during a pandemic) to 125 (the power to detain until "preventative treatment" has been administered.)When the "pandemic" strikes and special powers are enacted, neither my channel nor many others will be able to address the reality of things without consequences.
You can read the full Pandemic Response Plan here:
https://web.archive.org/web/20240821202231/https://www.health.govt.nz/publication/new-zealand-pandemic-plan-framework-actionNew Zealand Pandemic Plan: A framework for action
Interim update – July 2024
Published online:
12 July 2024
This version of the New Zealand Pandemic Plan updates the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action (Ministry of Health 2017).
The interim update was completed at pace, is limited in scope, and reflects changes to how the health system is run since the 2022 reforms and some of the early lessons from the COVID-19 response.
...
https://web.archive.org/web/20240820002343/https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/publications/interim_nz_pandemic_plan_v2.pdf...
Table 8: Health sector surveillance objectives
Objective National strategy or systems Owner Relevant
phase
Identify and monitor
international events of
concern and related
advice to inform action
in New Zealand
International Health Regulations 2005
(WHO 2006) and WHO communication
channels
Ministry of Health All
Detect cases and
clusters early
Notification through public health
services and laboratories
Public health
services, Ministry
of Health
Keep It Out,
Stamp It Out
Detect cases and
contacts
Monitoring of probable and confirmed
cases notified to the local medical
officer of health and through EpiSurv
(a database that collates notifiable
disease information) and Notifiable
Disease Management System
Public health
services, Health
New Zealand
All
Detect community
transmission
EpiSurv and sentinel surveillance and
genomic surveillance in various
settings
Ministry of Health,
Health New
Zealand
Stamp It Out
Monitor virological
changes domestically
Virological surveillance (various
methods) and molecular
epidemiological assessments of viral
transmissibility, disease severity and
impacts, including on prevention (eg,
vaccine effectiveness) and treatment
(eg, antiviral resistance) measures
Health New
Zealand
All
120 NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTIONObjective National strategy or systems Owner Relevant
phase
Monitor the level of
influenza-like illness,
infection and disease
activity in the
community and the
pressure on primary
health care services
Monitoring of influenza-like illness
consultations in sentinel practices
Ministry of Health,
Health New
Zealand
All
Influenza-like illness sentinel
surveillance (including virological
surveillance)
influenza-like illness sentinel
surveillance
Monitoring of influenza-like illness-
related calls to Healthline
Flu-tracking citizen science9 influenza-
like illness surveillance
Notifiable disease surveillance as
above (consider a role for over-the-
counter rapid antigen test self-
reporting)
Monitoring of testing and positivity
rates
Possible infection and sero-prevalence
surveys to assess prevalence
Possible Wastewater-based
epidemiology quantitation to monitor
infection trends
Monitor containment
activities being
undertaken
Monitoring of, for example:
• volumes of flights
• levels of contact tracing and
contact tracing performance
metrics
• levels of laboratory testing and
demographic coverage
Ministry of Health,
Public health
services, Health
New Zealand
Keep It Out,
Stamp It Out
Monitor pressure and
impacts on health
services and levels of
resources
Monitoring of, for example:
• public health services
• ambulance services
• primary health care use
• hospitalisations
• severe acute respiratory infections
• intensive care unit admissions and
ventilator use
• illness among personnel
• antivirals (national reserve supplies)
• vaccines uptake and equity of
access
• laboratory and testing services
• Healthline calls
Health New
Zealand
All
9 Citizen science is research conducted with participation from the general public, or amateur/
nonprofessional researchers.
NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 121Objective National strategy or systems Owner Relevant
phase
Monitor the impact on
the community and
population groups
Monitoring of data on absences from:
• schools
• the workforce in Health New
Zealand (including public health
services)
• employers in certain industries
• the state sector
Monitoring of impacts in certain
settings (eg, aged residential care
services)
Epidemiological analysis and research
on impacts across population groups
Ministry of Health,
Health New
Zealand, NPHS,
Whaikaha,
Ministry of
Education, State
Services
Commission
All
Assess the effectiveness
of interventions
Review and evaluation of the
pandemic response
Ministry of Health,
Health New
Zealand,
Whaikaha, other
government
agencies
All
Detect and monitor
deaths
EpiSurv and the Office of the Chief
Coroner
The Ministry of Health only reports
deaths confirmed as being due to the
pandemic virus to the WHO.
Alternative pragmatic definitions of
death may be needed as well.
Ministry of Health,
Health New
Zealand
All
Detect and monitor
longer-term morbidity
and sequalae associated
with the infection
Review hospital discharge data, health
survey and other relevant information
sources
Ministry of Health,
Health New
Zealand
Track the characteristics
of the virus
internationally,
including information
on incubation and
infectious periods,
severity, transmissibility
and antiviral sensitivity
Epidemiological reports from the
WHO, other health authorities and
sources
Ministry of Health All
Anticipate future
scenarios (modelling)
Modelling that describes potential
pandemic scenarios of cases and
hospitalisations and evaluates the
impact of potential public health
actions and policies
All All
Monitor public attitudes
and behavioural data
Behavioural surveys to assess
sentiment, social licence for public
health actions
Methods to track attitudes,
understanding and behavioural trends
over time
Monitoring systems to identify and
track levels of dis- and misinformation
All All
122 NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTIONLegislation
Mandatory measures are authorised by statute
Any action specified in this plan in relation to individuals, businesses or other entities
that includes the possibility of compulsory measures being taken must be authorised
by statute. The action is otherwise likely to be unlawful and, in particular, might be
contrary to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
Mandated measures may include:
• requirements for people to be tested, screened or vaccinated (may include arrivals
to New Zealand)
• quarantining or isolating people (ie, supporting those potentially exposed and those
with the disease in a quarantine or treatment/isolation facility (or at home) or
prohibiting them from leaving a particular facility/home)
• restricting the movement of people into or out of an area
• restricting travel (within or out of New Zealand)
• imposing a duty to supply information for risk assessment or contact tracing (eg,
future travel plans or past travel history)
• requirements for people to undergo preventive treatment
• requirements for people not to go to work or other public places or to do so only
under certain conditions
• commandeering of resources (eg, land, buildings or vehicles).
Where response measures involve mandated actions, particularly those that restrict
basic freedom of movement and association, a system needs to be developed with
clear criteria and processes to allow for exemptions to be sought and issued in a timely
and transparent manner.
Legislative measures
In a pandemic response, Government and designated officers may use available
legislative powers as appropriate to the particular situation. These include:
• powers provided for in the Health Act 1956 (‘routine’ and ‘special’ powers)
• additional powers available under the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 to facilitate
the management of serious epidemics of specified diseases
• additional powers under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (in a
state of emergency declared under that Act) if required in a very severe situation.
The powers in the Health Act 1956 and the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 can be
exercised only in relation to specific diseases or categories of disease (notifiable
disease and infectious disease, in the case of the Health Act, and quarantinable disease,
in the case of the Epidemic Preparedness Act). In particular, the Epidemic Preparedness
Act relates to only nine named quarantinable diseases set out in Part 3 of Schedule 1 of
the Health Act. (Quarantinable diseases are specifically dealt with in Part 4 of the
NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 123Health Act.) Infectious disease management powers, whether or not applied in an
emergency, were revised in 2017; they are set out in Part 3A of the Health Act. They
apply to all the infectious diseases set out in Schedule 1, including quarantinable
diseases.
Other legislation that contains provisions relevant to managing a pandemic includes:
• the Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 2016
• the Health (Burial) Regulations 1946
• the Health (Quarantine) Regulations 1983
• the Cremation Regulations 1983
• the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003
• the Medicines Act 1981 (and regulations made under that Act)
• event-specific legislation that may be enacted, such as the COVID-19 Public Health
Response Act 2020
• the Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Act 2022.
The Medicines Act 1981 provides mechanisms for the approval and classification of
medicines and controls conditions for prescribing, dispensing and selling medicines
(including vaccines). These controls can be changed quickly by notice in the Gazette
and may be relevant in particular pandemic situations. For example, in 2009 a Gazette
notice authorised the supply of prescription medications without a prescription when
supplied from a CBAC.
Table 9 provides a summary of specific legislative provisions.
Health Act 1956
The Health Act 1956 (and its associated regulations) is the core statute for a wide range
of public health functions. It details significant health protection roles for the Minister
of Health, the Director-General of Health, the Director of Public Health, statutory
officers (such as medical officers of health and health protection officers) and local
government officers (such as environmental health officers).
Medical officers of health and health protection officers would rely on two kinds of
primary powers in a pandemic: routine and special, as follows.
• Routine powers are available to the officers, and do not usually need prior approval
by someone else to use (although exercise of the Part 3A powers with regard to
non-notifiable infectious diseases requires the prior approval of the Director of
Public Health under delegation from the Director-General of Health).
• Special powers (for medical officers of health only) need prior authorisation
granted:
– by the Minister of Health
– by virtue of an epidemic notice having been issued by the Prime Minister under
the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 in connection with a quarantinable disease
– by virtue of a state of emergency having been declared under the Civil Defence
Emergency Management Act 2002.
124 NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTIONWhen authorised to do so, medical officers of health can exercise potentially very
significant powers. Such officers are accountable to, and subject to direction from, the
Director-General of Health. During COVID-19, significant powers were exercised at a
national level by the Director-General rather than by local medical officers of health.
Routine and special powers as defined in the legislation relate to specific diseases or
categories of disease.
The term ‘non-seasonal influenza’ (capable of being transmitted between human
beings) applies to any new form of influenza. Non-seasonal influenza is now specified
as a notifiable, infectious disease by its inclusion in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Health
Act. As such, medical officers of health may be authorised to use the Health Act’s
special powers to help manage non-seasonal influenza in the event of a pandemic, or
simply use the powers in Part 3A of the Act. However, there are some distinctions
between the two sets of powers, which means advice should be sought at the time
about which set is appropriate. For example, the special powers can be used nationally
and apply to whole communities as well as individuals. In most cases, Part 3A powers
only apply to individual cases and contacts, or suspected cases. An exception is a
direction to close an educational institution or part of it. The police are not expressly
authorised to enforce directions under Part 3A, but have an explicit enforcement role
with regard to the special powers.
Routine powers
Several routine powers are relevant in the pandemic context.
A medical officer of health or health protection officer has the power to enter any
premises, including by boarding an aircraft or ship, at any reasonable time if he or she
‘has reason to believe that there is or recently has been any person suffering from a
notifiable infectious disease or recently exposed to the infection of any such disease’
(section 77 of the Health Act).
The power to examine allows a medical officer of health or health protection officer to
medically examine any person in any premises, including on an aircraft or a ship, to
ascertain whether a person believed to be suffering from a notifiable infectious disease
or recently exposed is suffering or has recently suffered from the disease (section 77).
The power to detain at a specified place of residence for isolation purposes allows a
medical officer of health to issue a written direction to a person or contact whom the
officer believes on reasonable grounds poses a public health risk arising from an
infectious disease under sections 92I to section 92K. These sections outline a variety of
conditions the officer may specify in the direction, including to stay at all or specified
times at a specified place of residence, subject to specified conditions. The direction
must specify its duration. Directions cannot be used to compel a person to seek
treatment under Part 3A. For that to happen, the officer must apply for and be granted
a public health order, order for contacts or medical examination order with a treatment
order component under that Part. A medical officer of health may issue a direction
under section 92K to a person to undergo a medical examination, although several
preconditions must first be met (eg, the person has not complied with a previous
request to seek examination).NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 125A medical officer of health can also issue directions to the head of an educational
institution where staff or students pose a public health risk because of infectious
disease and the risk is unlikely to be managed effectively by solely giving directions to
individuals (section 92L). A medical officer of health may, after consultation with the
head of the institution, direct them to direct a student or staff member to stay away
from the institution for a specified period, until the infection risk has passed (section
92L). The Communicable Diseases Control Manual (Health New Zealand nd) (currently
under review) sets out disease incubation periods for various infectious diseases, which
will assist in determining how long unimmunised contacts and infectious cases must
stay away from the institution. Alternatively, the head may decide to take action
themselves, under the Education and Training Act 2020. Where it is necessary to close
part or all of the institution, the medical officer of health can issue a direction for
closure to the institution’s head.
Subpart 5 of Part 3A of the Health Act provides for formal contact tracing. This is most
useful in a situation in which voluntary contact tracing is not working, or the case is not
cooperating. A medical officer of health, health protection officer or other person
authorised to contact trace under subpart 5 can require the case to provide specified
information about contacts, including each of their identifying and contact details, in
order for the contact tracer to identify the disease’s source, make contacts aware that
they too may be infected and may require testing and treatment, and limit the
transmission of the disease.
Special powers
Special powers are authorised by the Minister of Health or by an epidemic notice or
apply where an emergency has been declared under the Civil Defence Emergency
Management Act 2002.
The power to detain, isolate or quarantine allows a medical officer of health to ‘require
persons, places, buildings, ships, vehicles, aircraft, animals, or things to be isolated,
quarantined, or disinfected’ (section 70(1)(f)).
The power to prescribe preventive treatment allows a medical officer of health, in
respect of any person who has been isolated or quarantined, to require people to
remain where they are isolated or quarantined until they have been medically
examined and found to be free from infectious disease, and until they have undergone
such preventive treatment as the medical officer of health prescribes (section 70(1)(h)).
The power to requisition premises allows a medical officer of health to requisition
premises and vehicles for the accommodation, treatment and transport of patients
(section 71(1)).
The closure of premises such as schools can be required under sections 70(1)(1a) and
70(1)(m). This can be made by way of written order to the person in charge of the
premises or order published in a newspaper or broadcast by television or radio and
able to be received by most households in the district. If specified in the order,
premises operating certain infection control measures may be exempted from closure.
Section 71A states that a member of the police may do anything reasonably necessary
(including the use of force) to help a medical officer of health or any person authorised
126 NEW ZEALAND PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
by the medical officer of health in the exercise or performance of powers or functions
under sections 70 or 71.
These special powers were used for the first time during the response to COVID-19. In
general terms, they performed well. However, there were some mis-steps in their
application, they lack procedural and human rights safeguards and court judgments
have found that while they can be used as a stop-gap measure in emergency
situations, they are not suitable for sustained, complex responses....
